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ANTITRUST: STANDING, BOYCOTTS, VERTICAL
ARRANGEMENTS, BUYER'S RIGHTS, TYING, AND
MERGERS
BY WILLIAM M. HANNAY*
The pendulum continued to swing back toward the center in the
United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, as the court
continued its trend of putting into practice the principle that the anti-
trust laws protect "competition, not competitors."' In a series of deci-
sions in which defendants uniformly prevailed, the court provided new
clarification of the boundaries of the antitrust laws.
STANDING: JEPP v FE.L. PUBLICATIONS AND BICHAN v.
CHEMETRON
In two decisions, the Court of Appeals fleshed out the bones of
standing rules in antitrust cases, but left unclear the appropriate stand-
ing "test."
In Repp v. FEL. Publications, Ltd ,2 the Seventh Circuit affirmed
the dismissal of a complaint on standing grounds. Plaintiff Repp is a
composer of liturgical music. In 1966 and 1967, Repp entered into sev-
eral contracts with F.E.L. Publications, Ltd. (F.E.L.), a publisher and
distributor of such music. Through these agreements, Repp assigned to
F.E.L. all his rights, including all rights of copyright, in various of his
musical compositions in return for royalties as set forth in the
agreement.
In 1972, F.E.L. commenced a practice whereby it granted to indi-
viduals or organizations an unlimited license to copy any of the works
assigned to F.E.L., including the works of Repp, for a blanket annual
fee. 3 Since the institution of this business practice, sales of Repp's mu-
sical creations in printed form and his artistic performances in the form
of phonograph records, it was alleged, "steadily and drastically dimin-
* Mr. Hannay received his B.A. from Yale College in 1966 and his J.D. from Georgetown
in 1973. He joined the Chicago law firm of Schiff Hardin & Waite in 1979 and is currently an
adjunct instructor at lIT/Chicago Kent College of Law.
1. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977); Brown Shoe Co.
v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).
2. 688 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1982) (Grant, Senior District Judge, Northern District of Indiana,
sitting by designation).
3. Id at 443. For further background on F.E.L.'s licensing practices, see F.E.L. Publica-
tions, Ltd. v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, discussed infra at text accompanying notes 145-161.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
ished. ' '4 Repp alleged that demand for his works was diminished and
in turn that he had been deprived of revenues, because interested par-
ties could only obtain his works by also obtaining and paying for other,
undesired musical works.5 Repp contended that F.E.L.'s licensing
practice thus violated the Sherman and Clayton Acts. 6
On October 8, 1980, the district court dismissed Repp's action. In
addressing the federal antitrust claim, the court stated that Repp could
not assert he was entitled to the remedies provided by the Acts. The
court explained that recovery was limited to those injured by the de-
fendant's restraints on competitive forces in the economy. 7 The Court
of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal.8
The Seventh Circuit began by accepting as true Repp's claim that
F.E.L.'s licensing practice constituted a violation of federal antitrust
laws and that he had been economically injured as a result of that prac-
tice. The court pointed out, however, that such a showing is not
enough in itself for a plaintiff to succeed in a private treble damage
action under Section 4 of the Clayton Act.9 It emphasized that "vari-
ous doctrines, the most notable being standing, have been developed to
limit the treble damages remedy to those truly intended by the laws to
be protected from anticompetitive conduct."' 0 Quoting an earlier deci-
sion, the court drew attention to the requirement in all antitrust claims
that the injury complained of be of a type that the antitrust laws were
designed to guard against and that the antitrust violation be the direct
cause of plaintiff's injury."
The court acknowledged that "[a]s a practical matter. . . the stan-
dards of 'antitrust injury' and 'direct causation' provide little meaning-
ful assistance in determining whether a particular plaintiff has
standing" and explained that courts have developed various standing
4. 688 F.2d at 443.
5. Id
6. 688 F.2d at 441.
7. Id at 443-4. The district court dismissed the other contract-related counts of the com-
plaint on abstention grounds, since a parallel state court proceeding was pending in California.
Id. at 443. Only the ruling on the antitrust count was appealed. Id at 441.
8. Id at 447.
9. Id at 444. Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides in part:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything for-
bidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United States in
the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to
the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained,
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
10. 688 F.2d at 444.
11. Id (quoting Havoco of America, Ltd. v. Shell Oil Co., 626 F.2d 549, 556 (7th Cir. 1980)).
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tests; in particular, the "direct injury" test and the "target area" test.'
2
The court quoted with approval the definitions of these two tests set
forth in a concurring opinion to the Eighth Circuit's decision in TV
Signal Company of Aberdeen v. American Telephone & Telegraph .13
The court noted that the "direct injury" test denies standing to a third
party who comes between the plaintiff and the defendant. The "target
area" test determines if the plaintiff is within the area of the economy
which is endangered by the breakdown of competition caused by the
violation.' 4 Stating that no test had yet been adopted in the Seventh
Circuit, the panel declined to expressly adopt a standing test because
Repp would not have had standing in either case regardless of which
test was adopted.'
5
Under the "target area" test, the Seventh Circuit found that the
key inquiry is "to identify, from the perspective of the alleged violator,
the persons or entities at whom the challenged business practice was
primarily directed and the purpose for which the practice was insti-
tuted."' 16 Since F.E.L.'s licensing practice was directed towards users of
the musical works and not suppliers,' 7 Repp's alleged damage "falls
outside the range of economic injuries intended to be protected by a
declaration that the licensing practice is unlawful."' 18 Repp's alleged
damage must therefore be characterized as "'indirect,' 'secondary' and
'remote' and not of the type that the antitrust laws were intended to
protect." 19
With respect to the "direct injury" test, the Seventh Circuit con-
cluded that the identical result is reached with essentially the same eco-
nomic analysis.20  The court held that Repp's injuries "are not
immediately related to the licensing practice but rather to the obliga-
tions and responsibilities assumed by F.E.L. by contract," and accord-
ingly are not direct injuries.
2'
In Bichan v. Chemetron Corp. ,22 the Seventh Circuit again consid-
12. 688 F.2d at 444.
13. 617 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1980) (Henley, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
14. Id at 1311.
15. 688 F.2d 445.
16. Id
17. Id
18. Id at 446.
19. Id The court declined to follow the decision in Mulvey v. Samuel Goldwyn Productions,
433 F.2d 1073 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 923 (1971), and instead found persuasive the
reasoning in Fields Productions, Inc. v. United Artists Corp., 318 F. Supp. 87 (S.D.N.Y. 1969),
af'd without opinion, 432 F.2d 1010 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 949 (1971).
20. 688 F.2d at 447.
21. Id
22. 681 F.2d 514 (7th Cir. 1982) (Bauer, J.).
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ered the question of standing to bring a private treble damage action
under section 4 of the Clayton Act 23 and again concluded that the
plaintiff lacked standing. This time, the party seeking relief was not the
supplier of a product used in an alleged tie-in further down the stream
of commerce, but rather was an employee of an alleged antitrust co-
conspirator who refused to participate in the conspiracy.
Plaintiff Bichan was hired as the president of Chemetron's Indus-
trial Gas Division. Bichan alleged that a conspiracy existed among
Chemetron and six other manufacturers of industrial gas to allocate
customers, fix prices and to impose conditions of sales on customers. 24
Bichan claimed that he acted contrary to established marketing prac-
tices by competing for customers of other producers. In July of 1976,
shortly after successfully obtaining an account from a customer who
traditionally purchased gas from another producer, Bichan was -fired
and allegedly black-listed because of his refusal to continue to adhere
to the industry's illegal practices. 25 Bichan argued that, having lost sal-
ary and bonuses as a direct result of his refusal to participate in the
conspiracy, he suffered an injury within the meaning of section 4 of the
Clayton Act.
26
Writing for the panel, Judge Bauer affirmed a district court's dis-
missal of the complaint, holding that resolution of the standing ques-
tion is a two step process. First, the court had to determine whether
Bichan's injury was an "antitrust injury" which was "of the type the
antitrust laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which
makes defendants' act unlawful. ' 27 Second, it had to be determined if
Bichan was the "proper party to bring this suit."' 28 Pointing out that
"the antitrust laws were not intended as a 'panacea for all wrongs,'"29
the court noted that differing tests have been devised to identify which
parties should be permitted to sue under section 4. The court discussed
the "target area" and "direct injury" tests. The court also defined a
third test, the "zone-of-interest" test, which requires the plaintiff to
prove a causal relationship between his business and the antitrust viola-
tion.30 Beyond these tests, the court identified an additional test which
23. See supra note 9 for the text of section 4 of the Clayton Act.
24. 681 F.2d at 515.
25. Id
26. Id
27. Id (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)).
28. 681 F.2d at 515 (citing Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977)).
29. 681 F.2d at 515 (quoting Parmelee Transportation Co. v. Keeshin, 292 F.2d 794, 804 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 944 (1961)).
30. 681 F.2d at 516.
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must be met; namely, that only those parties who can efficiently indi-
cate the purposes of the antitrust laws have proper standing.
31
Without mention of Repp v. FE.L Publications, Ltd ,32 decided
barely a month before, the court began its discussion by stating that
"[t]he parties agree that this circuit has adopted the target area test."
'33
The court perceived this case to be controlled by its earlier decision,
Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co. case, 34 which the court described as
the "leading case in this circuit applying the target area test.' ' 35 Under
this test, for Bichan to prevail, he would have to show that he had been
a target of the alleged conspiracy.
36
The court concluded that Bichan was not a target of the alleged
anticompetitive practices because his injury did not result from a lack
of competition in the labor market. Rather, the conspiracy was aimed
at reducing competition in the industrial gas market. Thus, Bichan
suffered no antitrust injury.37 Although Bichan argued that he was ac-
tively increasing competition by wooing customers of other producers,
the court held that his ability to affirmatively promote competition was
"totally irrelevant." Bichan's injuries did not stem from a lessening of
competition in the industrial gas industry while the "target area" test
would require that they did. 38
The court declined to follow a recent Ninth Circuit case, Ostrofe v.
H S. Crocker Co. ,39 which held that a sales manager in a situation very
similar to that of Bichan's may bring a private treble damage action.
The Crocker majority held that Congress intended that section 4 pro-
tect any injury falling "within the core of Congressional concern under-
lying the substantive provisions of the antitrust laws allegedly
violated." 4  The Seventh Circuit rejected the Crocker holding and
adopted the dissent of Judge Kennedy in that case. The court ex-
plained that the United States Supreme Court case law holds that
31. Id
32. See text accompanying notes 2 through 21 for discussion of Repp v. F.E.L. Publications,
Ltd., 688 F.2d 441 (2d Cir. 1982).
33. 681 F.2d at 517.
34. 586 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979).
35. 681 F.2d at 518.
36. Id at 517.
37. Id The court distinguished the two cases relied upon by plaintiff on the ground that the
alleged conspiracies there were directed at restricting freedom of employment. See Radovich v.
National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957) (boycott to prevent football players from transfer-
ring to teams in other leagues); Nichols v. Spencer International Press, Inc., 371 F.2d 332 (7th Cir.
1967) (publishers agreed not to employ each other's former employees).
38. 681 F.2d at 518.
39. 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982) Crocker was followed in Shaw v. Russell Trucking Line,
Inc., 1982-83 Trade Cas. 65,044 (W.D. Pa. 1982), without reference to the Bichan case.
40. Id at 1387.
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"[Section] 4 protects only those persons injured as consumers or com-
petitors in a defined market or in a discrete area of the economy" and
that in fashioning the antitrust laws, "Congress was concerned with
competition, not employee coercion or discharge."'4 ' Accordingly, the
court concluded that Bichan sustained no "antitrust injury" because he
was not the target of the alleged anticompetitive practices and because
his injury did not result "from the defendants' acquisition or exploita-
tion of market power."
42
Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit expanded on the additional re-
quirement for standing.43 Even if it had accepted the Crocker holding,
the court stated it still would "not believe Bichan is the proper party to
bring a treble damages action because his injury is simply too remote
from the alleged illegal conduct.""4 Asserting that the legislative his-
tory of section 4 indicates that the treble damages remedy was intended
primarily as a "consumer welfare prescription," 45 the court stated its
belief that "the phrase 'by reason of implies a standing requirement
limiting the statute's applicability to those plaintiffs who are efficient
enforcers of the antitrust laws." 46 The panel rejected plaintiff's argu-
ments that extending protection to employees who encourage competi-
tion is consistent with the goals of the antitrust laws and that protecting
those who encourage competition is the most effective method of elimi-
nating antitrust violations. The court held that "[a]n appropriate bal-
ance is achieved by granting standing only to those who, as consumers
or competitors, suffer immediate injuries with respect to their business
or property.
'47
The Bichan decision is somewhat troubling for two reasons. First,
it appears to accept the "target area" test for standing as it were the
established rule in the Seventh Circuit despite the contrary holding in
the Repp case. Second, while there are good reasons for restricting the
focus of antitrust relief to customers and competitors, the Bichan opin-
ion devotes little attention to the policy considerations attendant upon
denying standing to one who refused to cooperate in an illegal conspir-
41. 681 F.2d at 519.
42. Id
43. See generally supra note 38.
44. 681 F.2d at 519.
45. Id at 520 (quoting Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979)).
46. 681 F.2d at 520 (citing Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977); Calderone Enter-
prises Corp. v. United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc., 454 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 930 (1972)).
47. 681 F.2d at 520. Pursuant to Circuit Rule 16, the Bichan opinion was circulated among
all the judges of the Seventh Circuit because it created a conflict with the Ninth Circuit. The
opinion indicates that no judge voted to hear the matter en banc. Id. at 514.
ANTITRUST
acy. Assuming the existence of such a conspiracy and assuming that an
employee had cooperated-rather than resisted as Bichan alleged he
had-the employee himself would be criminally liable for his part in
the conspiracy. Yet, by resisting the conspiracy, he opens himself up to
discharge. The employee is thus placed between a rock and a hard
place, thereby becoming as much a victim of an antitrust conspiracy as
the customers who were its direct target. The conflict in the circuits on
this issue is one that should be resolved by the Supreme Court.
BoYcoTTs: U.S. TROTTING ASSOCIATION V CHICAGO DOWNS AND
TOLKAN DATSUN V GiFE4 TER MIL WA UKEE DATSUN
DEALERS
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit gave
greater definition to the area of boycott law in two cases during the
1981-82 term. In each case, the court ruled in favor of the defendant.
In United States Trotting Association v. Chicago Downs Association ,48
the court reversed summary judgment granted to the defendant on its
antitrust counterclaim against the plaintiff, holding that the rule of rea-
son is the appropriate standard to apply to the alleged boycott therein.
The United States Trotting Association (USTA) is a non-profit or-
ganization founded in 1939 to develop comprehensive national records
and to promulgate uniform rules and standards for harness racing.
49
USTA has no interest in racing horses nor in any race tracks or race
meetings. It functions solely as a sanctioning organization and infor-
mation bank.50 USTA issues registration certificates which describe in
detail a horse's physical markings and pedigree and identifies its owner
and breeder. 51 It also issues eligibility certificates which contain per-
formance information compiled from the horse's prior racing season.
The information on the eligibility certificate is updated throughout the
current season by USTA judges. Elgibility certificates are used by
track officials to select competitive horses for balanced race fields; re-
gistration certificates are chiefly important in ensuring accurate identi-
fication and honest transfers of harness horses.
52
In Illinois, the legislature has relied on USTA as an integral part
of its regulatory scheme. Illinois law requires that all horses entering
48. 665 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (Cummings, C.J.).
49. Id at 783.
50. Id
51. Id at 784.
52. Id
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harness races be registered with and meet the requirements of USTA. 53
Furthermore, the Illinois Racing Board Rules provide that any harness
horse entered at a parimutuel track have a current USTA eligibility
certificate, that all matters relating to registration of harness horses be
governed by USTA rules, and that persons suspended by USTA be
barred from participating in harness race meetings.54 There are thir-
teen other states which allow parimutuel harness racing that have also
incorporated USTA standards in their regulatory schemes.
55
During the 1975, 1977, and subsequent racing seasons, neither
Chicago Downs (an Illinois management corporation that sponsors
race meetings at Sportman's Park in Cicero, Illinois) nor Fox Valley
(another Illinois management corporation sponsoring harness horse-
racing meetings at Sportman's Park) joined USTA as a regular member
or contracted to purchase USTA's services. Nevertheless, both Chi-
cago Downs and Fox Valley continue to hold races with USTA-regis-
tered horses and to use the information contained on USTA
registration and eligibility certificates. The Court of Appeals character-
ized Chicago Downs and Fox Valley as "enjoy[ing] a paradigmatic
'free ride,' receiving all the benefits of USTA affiliation with none of
the attendant costs."' 56 In an effort to put an end to this "free riding,"
USTA announced to its members its intention to invoke certain sanc-
tions: providing no services to either, entering no information in its
records about racing performances at their meets, and prohibiting its
members from racing horses at meets sponsored by the two
organizations.
57
In addition to taking these actions, USTA filed suit against Fox
Valley and Chicago Downs alleging that these defendants had misap-
propriated USTA's records and services, particularly its registration
and eligibility certificates. Fox Valley filed a counterclaim alleging that
USTA's threatened enforcement of its rules prohibiting members from
racing horses at meets sponsored by non-member organizations consti-
tuted a group boycott which was per se violative of section 1 of the
Sherman Act. The district court granted summary judgment for Fox
53. Id See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 8, § 37-3.06(c) (1979).
54. 665 F.2d at 784.
55. Id
56. Id
57. USTA directed its members' attention to Rules 5 and 17 in its by-laws: Rule 5 provides
that members who race horses at meets sponsored by organizations that are not USTA members
or contract tracks are subject to revocation of their eligibility certificates and may be precluded
from obtaining certificates for future racing seasons. Rule 17 provides that USTA member drivers
who drive horses at unaffiliated tracks can be fined up to one hundred dollars for each infraction.
665 F.2d at 785.
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Valley and permanently enjoined USTA from "preventing its members
from racing at tracks which are not USTA members .... -58 The
Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for consideration under the
rule of reason.5 9
The court recognized that the Supreme Court has found certain
group boycottsper se illegal but quoted with approval the language of
the District of Columbia Circuit in Smith v. Pro Football, Inc. 60 The
court then pointed out that aper se rule has never been applied by the
Supreme Court to concerted refusals that are not designed to drive out
competitors but to achieve some other goal.
61
Applying these teachings to the instant case, the court found that
there was concerted activity only in the sense that USTA is a member-
ship organization enforcing its by-law rules and that there was no
showing of a purpose to exclude competitors since Fox Valley and
USTA were not competitors. The court also pointed out the absence of
any subtler scheme, such as certain tracks combining behind the facade
of USTA to drive Fox Valley out of business. Rather, the court
pointed to a strong showing that USTA "was organized to ensure hon-
est harness racing .... -62 Thus USTA was entitled to have the effects
of application of its by-law rules evaluated under the rule of reason.
63
The court further pointed out that federal courts have not had the
kind of experience with organizations like USTA that would warrant
extending the per se rule to this case, pointing to the "inconsistency
between the state of our knowledge and the certitude of the per se
rule" 64 as indicated by the extent to which the USTA's rules minimize
its "free rider" problems. 65 The result of theper se approach would be
to foreclose all justifications USTA might make, "perhaps without
58. 487 F. Supp. 1008, 1017 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
59. 665 F.2d 781 (7th Cir. 1981) (en banc).
60. 593 F.2d 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1978). The District of Columbia Circuit stated:
[T]he common attribute of per se illegal boycotts is a concerted attempt by a group of
competitors at one level to protect itself from competition from non-group members who
seek to compete at that level.
Id at 1173.
61. 665 F.2d at 788. The Seventh Circuit noted:
The danger of rote application of theper se rule to all conduct that can be called a
group boycott is that the sound teachings of experience will be extended into new and
unfamiliar areas where they have no proper application.
Id
62. Id at 788-89.
63. Id at 789, citing, Gunter Harz Sports, Inc. v. U.S. Tennis Ass'n, 511 F. Supp. 1103, 1115
(D. Neb. 1981). Subsequent to the announcement of the decision in the instant case, 6iunter Harz
Sports was affirmedper curiam by the Eighth Circuit. 665 F.2d 222 (8th Cir. 1981).
64. 665 F.2d at 789.
65. Id The court noted that the Supreme Court gave free-riding serious attention in Conti-
nental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 54-57 (1977).
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achieving any procompetitive result."'66
The court identified a second, independent basis for its holding
that USTA's conduct should have been evaluated under the rule of rea-
son. Disagreeing with the district court, the Court of Appeals held that
Silver v. New York Stock Exchange67 controlled the instant case. The
Silver case and cases following it stated that aper se rule is not always
proper. The court believed that these cases mandate that courts be
hesitant in using the terms "group boycott" and ';er se" in businesses
involving organized sports.68 Thus, because a sporting activity was in-
volved, as well as because the conduct at issue was not within the "un-
deniably anticompetitiveper se boycott paradigm," the alleged boycott
by USTA should be tested under the rule of reason.
69
Judge Bauer dissented from the five-judge majority on the boycott
issue. Arguing that the majority misapprehended the nature of its in-
quiry, Judge Bauer urged that courts do have the requisite experience
with group boycotts to hold that they areper se unlawful even though
they may lack experience with sporting associations. 70 Further, the dis-
sent argued that the Supreme Court has defined "group boycott" to
include a boycott of noncompetitors, citing St. Paul Fire & Marine In-
surance Co. v. Barry.7' Finally, the dissent disagreed that Silver was
controlling, urging that the Supreme Court had not recognized there "a
justification derived from a need for industry self-regulation.
72
In its opinion, the majority responded to the dissent, noting that St.
Paul Fire & Marine was unhelpful because the Court there made clear
that it was not addressing the question of what constituted a per se
66. Id
67. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
68. 665 F.2d at 789-90 (citations omitted).
There is now a considerable body of law, derived more or less proximately from Silver,
recognizing that in certain self-regulatory contexts binding rules must be developed to
safeguard the enterprise's viability, and that application of aper se standard of illegality
to such endeavors is improper. Post-Silver court of appeals decisions have frequently
acknowledged that in organized sports "interdependence," "cooperation," and at least "a
few rules are essential to survival," and have often eschewed per se analysis in passing
upon antitrust challenges to such rules. These cases provide support for the proposition
that, in the context of organized sports and sanctioning organizations, courts should be
hesitant to fasten upon tags such as "group boycott" and "per se'" in order to preclude
inquiry into the business necessity for or precise harm occasioned by particular rules or
practices.
IdS
69. Id at 790.
70. 665 F.2d at 793-94 (Bauer, J., dissenting).
71. 438 U.S. 531, 541 (1978), cited at 665 F.2d 794.
72. 665 F.2d at 794, citing National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435
U.S. 679, 689-90 (1978).
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unreasonable boycott.73 The majority also rejected the dissent's appar-
ent notion that a "boycott is a boycott is a boycott," pointing out that
those cases which have found an antitrust violation from a boycott
were ones in which the conduct was unequivocally anticompetitive.
74
Finally, the majority rejected the dissent's attack upon its interpretation
of Silver, explaining that, rather than being based upon "the assump-
tion that competition itself is unreasonable"' 7 as the dissent main-
tained, the majority "merely require[s] that the trial court must find
rather than presume harm to competition. ' 76 Citing its other 1981 de-
cisions in Lektro- Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co. 77 and in Quality Auto Body,
Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Co. 78 the court emphasized that "a plaintiff or
counterclaimant must prove adverse impact in the relevant market to
establish a section 1 rule of reason violation.
'79
The court's approach seems correct. Rather than mechanically ap-
plying the term "group boycott", as the dissent would have done, the
majority properly recognized the ancient concept of ancillary restraints
by which a party may have "a right to restrain in order to protect its
legitimate interests."
' 80
In Phil Tolkan Datsun, Inc. v. The Greater Milwaukee Datsun Deal-
ers'Advertising Association, Inc. ,81 the court again reviewed a summary
judgment in the context of an alleged group boycott and this time af-
firmed summary judgment for defendant. Defendant Nissan Motor
Corporation distributes Japanese-made automobiles and trucks in the
United States under the name "Datsun". Beginning in 1976, Nissan
encouraged Datsun dealers to form local advertising associations and
offered to add forty dollars to the invoice of each car or truck sold to
each dealer in an area and to distribute this money to the local associa-
tion for joint advertising purposes. In addition, association members
were to be allowed extra allotments of cars for special Datsun promo-
tions. In August of 1978, defendant The Greater Milwaukee Datsun
Dealers' Association, Inc. ("Association") was formed.
73. 665 F.2d at 788 n.ll, citing St. Paul Fire & Marine, 438 U.S. at 542.
74. 665 F.2d at 789 n.12.
75. 435 U.S. 679, 696 (1978).
76. 665 F.2d at 790.
77. 660 F.2d 255 (7th Cir. 1981).
78. 660 F.2d 1203 (7th Cir. 1981).
79. 665 F.2d at 790 citing Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255, 268 (7th Cir. 1981)
cert. denied 102 S. Ct. 1277 (1982); Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Company, 660
F.2d 1195, 1203 (7th Cir. 1981), both of which are discussed in this article infra.
80. 665 F.2d at 790, quoting Lektro- Vend, 660 F.2d at 269; Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593
F.2d at 1183.
81. 672 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1982) (Cudahy, J.).
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In early 1979, Nissan solicited all car dealers in the four-county
Milwaukee area seeking an additional Datsun dealership. Over the
protests of several members of the defendant association, Nissan se-
lected plaintiff Tolkan, which was also a Pontiac dealer, as a new Dat-
sun dealer. In May of 1979, Tolkan Datsun was formally appointed a
Datsun dealer.
During this time, the Association had been planning a special Dat-
sun promotion, involving Datsun 210s, the lowest-priced Nissan car.
In that regard, the Association sought an additional allotment of 210
models for the promotion. In June of 1979, the Association's first ad-
vertising for the promotion appeared in local newspapers, but Tolkan
Datsun's name was not among the dealers listed. Tolkan complained
and was informed that it was not a member of the Association. Shortly
thereafter, Tolkan applied for membership in the Association, and in
July of 1979, its application was considered by the Association. The
members decided that Tolkan's admission would not be considered un-
til the end of the 210 model promotion and Tolkan was so informed.
In September of 1979, the Association again met to consider Tolkan's
admission and decided to deactivate the Association because no agree-
ment could be reached. In September of 1979, Tolkan filed suit
against the Association, claiming inter alia that the Association's re-
fusal to admit it as a member constituted a group boycott and was thus
per se illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act.8 2 Cross motions for
summary judgment were filed, and the district court granted the Asso-
ciation's motion, dismissing the complaint. The district court held that
the Association's conduct was neitherper se illegal nor illegal under the
rule of reason. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment.
83
Here again the court recognized that certain types of group boy-
cotts areper se antitrust violations, but again quoted with approval the
language in Smith v. Pro Football, Inc. 84 to the effect that the "hall-
mark" of aper se illegal group boycott is "the effort of competitors to
'barricade themselves from competition at their own level'."8 5 Empha-
sizing that recent Supreme Court decisions have cautioned against
"over zealous application" of theper se doctrine, the court noted that
several appellate cases, the USTA case among them, "point[ed] out the
pitfalls of sweeping too broadly with the characterizations, 'group boy-
82. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
83. 672 F.2d 1280 (7th Cir. 1982).
84. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (1978).
85. Id at 1284, quoting Smith, 593 F.2d at 1178.
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cott'." 86 The court then pointed out that membership arrangements in
trade organizations are exceptions to the rule that group boycotts are
per se violations of the antitrust laws.
87
Plaintiff Tolkan conceded the existence of such an exception but
argued that per se treatment was appropriate since both the purpose
and effect of the challenged membership restriction was to exclude
competitors or coerce conduct. In support of this argument, Tolkan
relied heavily on Associated Press v. United States88 and Silver v. New
York Stock Exchange .89 The court interpreted these two cases to mean
that per se treatment is not appropriate if the alleged group boycott
does not involve a direct effort to influence the supply or demand of a
competitor's product. 90 The court pointed out that, in the instant case,
plaintiff Tolkan had made no showing that membership in the Associa-
tion was necessary or even desirable to compete effectively as a Datsun
dealer. The plaintiff conceded that it had received twenty additional
210 model cars from Nissan in lieu of participation in the ongoing As-
sociation promotion.91 The court pointed out that the only concrete
injury alleged by plaintiff Tolkan was its inability to share in the profits
of the previously planned Datsun 210 special promotion and concluded
that this alleged injury reflected "an absence of anticompetitive effect,"
which was not surprising given the Association's "lack of market power
and its relative inability to influence either the supply of, or the de-
mand for, Datsun automobiles. '92 The court declined to accept the
contention "that any denial of membership by an ongoing trade associ-
ation constitutes a per se violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act
93
regardless of its lack of anticompetitive effect" and held that "member-
ship restrictions by trade organizations not possessed of significant eco-
nomic or operational leverage are more appropriately evaluated
according to the standards of the rule of reason."
'94
The court then proceeded to evaluate defendants' conduct in light
of the rule of reason. Quoting its recent decision in Lektro- Vend Corp.
86. 672 F.2d at 1285.
87. Id citing Florists' Nationwide Telephone Delivery Network v. Florists' Telegraph Deliv-
ery Ass'n, 371 F.2d 263, 268-69 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 387 U.S. 909 (1973); Smith v. Pro
Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173 (1978).
88. 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
89. 373 U.S. 341 (1963). See supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
90. 672 F.2d at 1286.
91. Id at 1286, n.6.
92. Id at 1286. The court also cited United States v. Realty Multi-List, Inc., 629 F.2d 1351,
1372 n.40 (5th Cir. 1980) (per se treatment of a real estate association's membership requirements
inappropriate where an association lacks market power).
93. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
94. 672 F.2d at 1287.
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v. Vendo Co., the court emphasized that "any Rule of Reason analysis
requires a showing of anticompetitive market effect."' 95  The court
could find none in Tolkan. The plaintiff had relied primarily on its loss
of profits from the special Datsun 210 promotion as evidence of such
an anticompetitive effect; however, as a factual matter (and as the dis-
trict court found), Tolkan Datsun had no clear right to participate in
this promotion. 96 Indeed, the Court of Appeals appeared offended by
plaintiffs effort to jump on the bandwagon of the Association's previ-
ous work97 and analogized it to the "free rider" problem in other areas
of antitrust law.
98
The court went on to hold that even if plaintiff Tolkan had been
entitled to participate in the 210 model promotion, "we are dubious
that its exclusion from such a limited one-shot transaction would be
sufficient to establish antitrust liability under the Rule of Reason." 99
The court pointed out that defendants' failure to reallocate promo-
tional vehicles to Tolkan after it became a licensed Datsun dealer did
not derogate from its ability to sell cars nor was Tolkan's continued
economic viability threatened by its exclusion from membership in the
Association. °0 Thus, plaintiffs allegations did not establish the sort of
anticompetitive injury that the antitrust laws were designed to
remedy 01
Both USTA and Tolkan Datsun stand as a warning against a
mechanical and dangerous application of the "group boycott" label.
VERTICAL ARRANGEMENTS: CRUM & FORSTER
AND VALLEY LIQUORS
This Term saw the arrival of yet another academician-turned-ju-
95. Id, quoting Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255, 268 (7th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 1277 (1982).
96. 672 F.2d at 1287.
97. The court stated that:
[T]o require defendants to share the profits of what turned out to be a shrewd investment
with a competitor who had risked no capital and who had entered the market after the
cars in question were selling like 'hot cakes', would violate the principle of rewarding
entrepreneurial risk-taking, a capitalist commonplace presumably endorsed by the Sher-
man Act.
Id at 1288.
98. Id at 1288 n.10, citing the Gospel of Matthew 20:1-20:16 inter a/ia (parable of the labor-
ers in the vineyard).
99. Id at 1288.
100. Id
101. Id, citing Havoco of America, Ltd. v. Shell Oil Co., 626 F.2d 549, 558 (7th Cir. 1980).
Moreover, the court pointed out that at oral argument it was established that Tolkan is now a fully
functioning member of the defendant association and has participated in all promotions under-
taken since the filing of the lawsuit. 672 F.2d at 1288-89.
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rist, as Professor Richard Posner of the University of Chicago took the
bench. Both of his maiden antitrust opinions related to vertical
arrangements.
In Products Liability Insurance Agency, Inc. v. Crum & Forster In-
surance Companies,0 2 the Court of Appeals again considered an alleg-
edly illegal refusal to deal and again affirmed a summary judgment for
defendants dismissing the complaint. The plaintiff is a corporation
owned and operated by an Illinois attorney named Byron Getzoff and,
since it had no existence apart from Getzoff, the court treated him as
the plaintiff. Of numerous defendants, only two were significant: Crum
& Forster and Paris, O'Day & Reed, Inc., an insurance agency.
Getzoff was a trial lawyer who specialized in defending ladder
manufacturers against product liability claims. In addition he acted as
an insurance broker who, working through Paris, procured product lia-
bility insurance for the ladder manufacturers from Crum & Forster.
Paris split its commissions on this insurance with Getzoff who was at
the same time the leading attorney handling product liability claims for
Crum & Forster.
Crum & Forster was unaware of Getzofls activities as an insur-
ance broker until Getzoff, who had had a falling out with Paris, de-
scribed his role to the company in a letter and stated that he had
requested each of the manufacturers to designate him as its exclusive
broker for product liability insurance, thus cutting out Paris. In the
weeks that followed, brokerage designations flowed into Getzoff from
the ladder manufacturers, but Crum & Forster informed Getzoff that it
would not appoint him an agent of the company. Most of the manufac-
turers then revoked their designations of Getzoff and subsequently
Crum & Forster -terminated Getzofls legal services. Thereafter,
Getzoff filed suit against Crum & Forster, Paris, and others.
The complaint did not question the lawfulness of Getzof's termi-
nation; rather, it alleged a conspiracy between Crum & Forster and
Paris to exclude Getzoff from the business of product liability insur-
ance for ladder manufacturers. The district court granted summary
judgment to defendants after pretrial discovery had been completed.
The Court of Appeals affirmed.
10 3
The Court of Appeals first considered the district court's conclu-
sion that Getzoff had not presented enough evidence of conspiracy to
resist the defendants' motion for summary judgment. Writing for the
102. 682 F.2d 660 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.).
103. Id
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panel, Judge Posner remarked that the district court gave more weight
than the Court of Appeals would be inclined to give to denials con-
tained in affidavits of Crum & Forster. 104 This, however, did not mean
that Getzoff was entitled to a trial; as the court pointed out, pretrial
discovery yielded no evidence of any agreement between Paris and
Crum & Forster to deny a role to Getzoff in the ladder manufacturer's
insurance program. While there was evidence from which it might be
concluded that Crum & Forster refused to appoint him as an insurance
agent because of his long standing conflict of interest, it was plain that
because the ladder program was nationwide and Getzoff a licensed in-
surance broker only in Illinois, he was ineligible to be an insurance
agent for Crum & Forster. 05 The court remarked that, under the cir-
cumstances, "we cannot understand how Crum & Forster could have
been expected to appoint him an agent to compete with or replace Paris
at that time."'°6 The court then held that this evidentiary record raised
no questions of material fact.
07
The court went on to hold that, even if it were wrong and a con-
spiracy "could somehow be teased out of the depositions and affida-
vits," summary judgment was nevertheless proper because the alleged
conspiracy was not in restraint of trade. 0 8 Stating that "[a]greements
that are illegal per se are for the most part horizontal," the court
pointed out that Crum & Forster and Paris are not competing sellers,
but are rather in a vertical relationship.' °9 The court explained that
vertical agreements are illegal per se "only if their purpose is price
fixing" and stated that the mere refusal of a supplier to deal with a
competitor of one of his distributors is not illegalper se.I 10
The court pointed out that "there is a sense in which eliminating
even a single competitor reduces competition" but that this "sense" is
not relevant in determining whether the antitrust laws had been vio-
104. Id at 662. The Court noted that "Conclusional denials of conspiracy in affidavits obvi-
ously drafted by lawyers are entitled to little weight in deciding whether to grant an antitrust
defendant's motion for summary judgment." Id
105. Id at 662-63.
106. Id
107. Id at 663.
108. Id
109. Id
110. Id See Oreck Corp. v. Whirlpool Corp., 579 F.2d 126, 133-34 (2d Cir. 1978) (en banc).
The Seventh Circuit stated in Crum & Forsier:
[lin the absence of any evidence of intent to raise prices--and there is no such evidence
in this case-an agreement whereby a supplier of some good or service refuses, at the
behest of one of his distributors, to deal with a competitor of that distributor is not illegal
per se. To prevail in such a case the plaintiff must show that the refusal to deal is likely
to reduce competition.
682 F.2d at 663.
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lated, for "[t]hose laws. . . are designed to protect the consumer inter-
est in competition.""' Plaintiffs obligation was not to show that Crum
& Forster excluded Getzoff because Paris wanted it to, but rather to
show that there was a deleterious effect on competition.
The court identified two possible theories of anti-competitive effect
that Getzoff might have tried to establish but held that pretrial discov-
ery produced no evidence to support either theory. The first theory
would have focused on Paris as the culprit, trying either to obtain or to
hold on to a dominant position in the market for insurance agents serv-
ices, by getting Crum & Forster to terminate Paris's potential competi-
tor Getzoff. Since such a theory "pre-supposes that Paris had a big
enough position in the market for insurance agency services to have a
realistic hope of obtaining at least some degree of monopoly power,"
the threshold issue related to relevant market and market shares, but
no evidence on these questions was in the record.112
An alternative theory of liability focuses on Getzoff as a potential
competitor of Crum & Forster rather than Paris. Getzoff apparently
emphasized this theory, arguing that Crum & Forster was afraid that if
he established himself as a insurance agent he would switch the ladder
manufacturers-his "captive market," as he called them--to another
insurance company and Crum & Forster would lose that business. The
court characterized Getzofis reference to his "captive market" as an
indication that he would cause the ladder manufacturers to switch to
another insurer "not with the purpose or likely effect of giving them the
benefits of competition but only to extract higher commissions for him-
self" which would not constitute "a competitive benefit." Since no evi-
dence was presented concerning the structure of insurance
underwriting market, any such theory "fails at the threshold."
113
As support for its allegation of an illegal boycott, Getzoff relied
upon Kor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. 114 Judge Posner distin-
guished Klor's from the instant case on its facts but went on to deny its
continuing vitality, noting that the Klor's decision came from an era
where there was more focus on the individual competitor. 15 Asserting
I 11. Id., citing Reiter v. Sonotone, 442 U.S. at 343. "The consumer does not care how many
sellers of a particular good or service there are; he cares only that there be enough to assure him a
competitive price and quality." Id at 664.
112. Id Cf. Northwest Power Products, Inc. v. Omark Industries, Inc., 576 F.2d 83, 90-91 (5th
Cir. 1978) (defendant with only 25% share of market and eight other competitors lack sufficient
market power to control market).
113. 682 F.2d at 664.
114. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
115. 682 F.2d at 665. The Court asserted, "Klor's in any event belonged to an area in the
Supreme Court's antitrust jurisprudence when the Court was concerned with the welfare of indi-
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that the Supreme Court's ultimate concerns in Klor's was with the im-
pact on consumers of a possible monopoly arising from the elimination
of small businessmen one at a time, Judge Posner concluded that "[t]his
private squabble does not threaten consumers' welfare even remotely"
and that Getzofl's exclusion "will [not] turn out to have been the first
step in a march toward a monopoly in the insurance business." '" 6
In Valley Liquors, Inc. v. Renfield Importers, Ltd., 1 7 the Court of
Appeals per Judge Posner affirmed a denial of a preliminary injunction
in a restricted distribution case. Plaintiff Valley Liquors, Inc. is a
wholesale wine and liquor distributor in Northern Illinois; defendant
Renfield Importers, Ltd. is one of its suppliers. In 1981, Renfield termi-
nated Valley as a distributor of Renfield's products (which included
such popular brands as Gordon's and Martini & Rossi) with respect to
certain Illinois counties. Valley sued, charging Renfield with a viola-
tion of section 1 of the Sherman Act" 8 and sought a preliminary in-
junction under Section 16 of the Clayton Act."19 The district court
(Grady, J.) denied the motion for preliminary injunction on the ground
that Valley had not demonstrated that it was likely to win the case if
tried in full.
From the evidence in the record, it appears that, until late 1981,
Renfield generally sold its products to several wholesalers in the same
county. Its sales had not been growing as rapidly in Illinois as in the
rest of the country. However, Renfield had decided to adopt a system
of restricted distribution whereby it would sell to one or at most two
wholesalers in each county. Although Valley was Renfield's largest
wholesaler in McHenry and DuPage Counties, accounting for some
50% of Renfield's total sales, the new plan terminated Valley and all
other Renfield distributors in the two counties except two companies
called Continental and Romano. The latter two companies, however,
were themselves terminated in certain other areas. In addition to this
evidence, there was unrebutted evidence that Valley had been selling
vidual competitors as well as with the health of the competitive process viewed as a means of
protecting consumers." Id
116. 682 F.2d at 665.
117. 678 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.).
118. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
119. Section 16 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 26) provides in pertinent part:
Any person . . . shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief . . . against
threatened loss or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws. . . when and under the
same conditions and principles as injunctive relief against threatened conduct that will
cause loss or damage is granted by courts of equity . . . and upon the execution of
proper bond against damages for an injunction improvidently granted and a showing
that the danger of irreparable loss or damage is immediate, a preliminary injunction may
issue. ...
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Renfield products at prices 5% below those charged by Renfield's other
distributors in McHenry and DuPage counties, and that Valley's termi-
nation followed discussion between Renfield, Continental, and Ro-
mano in which the latter expressed unhappiness at Renfield's
terminating them in other areas. There was virtually no evidence con-
cerning Renfield's motivation for the adoption of a more restricted dis-
tribution system except that it was a reaction to Renfield's
disappointing sales in Illinois.
Valley contended that two separate restraints of trade could be in-
ferred from these facts: first, a horizontal conspiracy among Renfield,
Continental and Romano to increase the wholesale prices of Renfield
products in McHenry and DuPage counties; and, second, a vertical re-
striction unreasonably restraining trade by excluding Valley from Mc-
Henry and DuPage Counties.
20
With respect to the "horizontal" price fixing theory of Valley,
Judge Posner recognized that the Third Circuit had held it unlawfulper
se for a manufacturer to terminate a distributor at the behest of a com-
peting distributor who wants to reduce price competition in Cernuto,
Inc. v. United Cabinet Corp. 121 Judge Posner added a significant gloss
to Cernuto, however, holding that the distributor and supplier must
have the same desire. Should Renfield attempt to be more competitive
by restricting its products' distribution, the antitrust laws would not be
violated just because the distributors followed so they would have less
price competition. 22 The court pointed out that there was no direct
evidence that Renfield was acceding to the desire of its other distribu-
tors in terminating Valley and that, since Renfield may have had rea-
sons for terminating Valley that were independent of the desire of
Continental and Romano, such a possibility is enough to rebut an in-
120. 678 F.2d at 743.
121. 595 F.2d 164 (3rd Cir. 1979).
122. 678 F.2d at 744, citing Alloy International Co. v. Hoover-NSK Bearing Co., 635 F.2d
1222, 1226 n.6 (7th Cir. 1980); Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, II
(3d Cir. 1980). Judge Posner went on to muse about his holding as follows:
There is, we admit, a certain unreality in the careful parsing of motives that Cernuto
seems to require. If a supplier wants his distributors to emphasize nonprice rather than
price competition,. . . he will be hostile to price cutters because they will make it harder
for his other distributors to recoupe the expenditures that he wants them to make on
presale services to consumers and on other forms of nonprice competition, and of course
the undersold distributors will be equally or more hostile. The motive of supplier and
distributors alike could thus be described as wanting to eliminate price cutters yet there
would be no per se illegality so long as the supplier was not just knuckling under to the
distributors' desire for less competition. It is difficult to see how a court could distinguish
empirically between such a case and the pure antipathy to price competition envisaged
by Cernuio. But the unraveling of this skein can be left for another occasion.
678 F.2d at 745.
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ference of collusion with those distributors. 23
Turning to the vertical aspects of the case, the court considered the
implication of the fact that Valley sold at lower prices than the other
distributors in McHenry and DuPage Counties. Because the territorial
restrictions had the effect of reducing price competition among whole-
salers, Valley contended that this reduction established a primafacie
case of unreasonable restraint of trade, shifting to Renfield the burden
of showing an offsetting increase in competition between brands sup-
plied by Renfield on one hand and brands supplied by other importers
or national distributors on the other, ie., an increase in inter-brand
competition. Judge Posner attacked this contention frontally, asserting
that "[w]e reject the casual equation of intrabrand price competition
with intrabrand competition."'' 24 The judge explained that the plaintiff
in a restricted distribution case must show that the restriction is unrea-
sonable, because weighing the effects on both interbrand and in-
trabrand competition only hurts consumers more. 25
The court considered how such a weighing of effects was to be
conducted and concluded that the approach of the Fifth and Ninth Cir-
cuits was the correct one: "the balance tips in the defendant's favor if
the plaintiff fails to show that the defendant has significant market
power (that is, power to raise prices significantly above the competitive
level without losing all of one's business)."' 126 The court explained that
a firm lacking any market power cannot afford to adopt policies that
disserve consumers because of market reaction. Consumer welfare,
which should be the interpretative guide to the Sherman Act, is not
seriously threatened by such action.127 Since no evidence of Renfield's
market power had been introduced by Valley, its vertical claim also
had to fail.' 28
123. Id
124. Id at 745.
125. Judge Posner elaborated:
The elimination of a price cutter who was taking a free ride on the promotional efforts of
competing distributors will tend to stimulate nonprice competition among the distribu-
tors at the same time that it dampens price competition among them, so that the net
effect on intrabrand competition need not be negative. In any event, the suggestion that
proof of a reduction in intrabrand competition creates a presumption of illegality is in-
consistent with the test that the courts apply in restricted distribution cases. The plaintiff
in a restricted distribution case must show that the restriction he is complaining of was
unreasonable because, weighing effects on both intrabrand and interbrand competition,
it made consumers worse off.
Id
126. Id, citing Muenster Butane, Inc. v. Stewart Co., 651 F.2d 292, 298 (5th Cir. 1981); Cow-
ly v. Braden Industries, Inc., 613 F.2d 751, 755 (9th Cir. 1980).
127. 678 F.2d at 745, citing Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979).
128. 678 F.2d at 745. With respect to market power, the court stated, "Since market power
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Judge Posner's opinions in Crum & Forster and Valley Liquors are
written in a style more reminiscent of a university lecture than a care-
fully-phrased judicial opinion, and they are decidedly an effort on his
part to put his academic theories into practice.' 29 Yet this is not to say
that the opinions are inconsistent with Seventh Circuit precedent.
Rather, they represent an extension of the court's concern for economic
and business reality.
THE BUYER'S RIGHT TO CHOOSE His SELLER:
QUALITY AUTO BODY v ALLSTATE
In Quality Auto Body, Inc. v. Allstate Insurance Company, 30 the
Seventh Circuit affirmed a summary judgment for the defendants
under section 1 of the Sherman Act131 in a case involving automobile
insurance claims procedures. The district court had dismissed the case,
concluding that the challenged conduct constituted neither horizontal
nor vertical price-fixing, nor a group boycott.
3 2
Defendant Allstate Insurance Company ("Allstate") and defend-
can rarely be measured directly by the methods of litigation, it is normally inferred from posses-
sion of a substantial percentage of the sales in a market carefully defined in terms of both product
and geography. See, e.g., Red Diamond Supply, Inc. v. Liquid Carbonic Corp., 637 F.2d 1001,
1005 (5th Cir. 1981)." Id. The court pointed out that no market was defined and no evidence of
market share was presented. The court also pointed out that Valley made no effort to establish
Renfield's market power by "some alternative route, not involving proof of relevant market and
market share," but the court did not elaborate on what alternative if any if had in mind. Id
129. In his 1976 book Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective Judge Posner described his
thoughts on "restricted distribution" arrangements, as follows:
I believe that the law should treat price and nonprice restrictions the same. . . . The
difficult question is whether the law should permit or prohibit price and nonprice restric-
tions in distribution, however imposed. The answer is not an easy one to give ....
However, economic theory suggests that it will more commonly be manufacturer im-
posed and efficiency enhancing than dealer imposed and monopolizing. The number of
firms in and the ease of entry into most branches of distribution militate strongly against
effective caretelization of distribution. Effective dealer cartels are probably rare and this
ought to rule out a per se rule against restricted distribution.
But we don't yet know enough about restricted distribution to adopt a rule of per se
legality either, and consequently I believe that the Justice Department (and other anti-
trust plaintiffs) should be permitted to continue to bring cases challenging restrictions in
distribution. But they should be required toprove that the challenged restriction is, in
fact, a dealer cartel. * * * Therefore, distribution cases cannot be decided simply by
identifying the source of the restriction (i.e., whether the manufacturer or the dealer)-
even if that were an easy thing to do. It is necessary in every case to determine whether
the objective of the challenged restriction is to increase the provision of presale services
or to generate monopoly profits. * * * [T]his suggests a possible rule for deciding some
restricted-distribution cases: the lawfulness of the restriction should be conclusively pre-
sumed if the aggregate share of the relevant market possessed by the firms whose compe-
tition is restricted is not of monopoly proportions.
R. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE, 165-66 (1976).
130. 660 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1717 (1982).
131. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
132. 1980-2 Trade Cas. 63,507 (N.D. Ill. 1980) (Decker, J.).
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ant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company ("State
Farm") had developed certain policies and practices in processing au-
tomobile damage claims of their policyholders. Most of Allstate's
claims are processed under the company's "shop of the customer's
choice" policy which permits the insured to choose the shop that will
repair the damaged vehicle. Before the repair work is done, however,
an Allstate adjuster will examine the loss and attempt to reach an
agreed price with the representative of the repair shop selected by the
customer so that the insurance settlement will cover the entire cost of
repairs (less any deductible). If the Allstate adjuster is unable to reach
an agreed price with the shop, Allstate will pay the insured an amount
that represents, in the company's opinion, the competitive cost of re-
pair. If the insured so desires, Allstate will provide the name of a shop
or shops which will in all likelihood be willing to repair the vehicle for
the price estimated by Allstate's adjuster. In addition, Allstate permits
certain shops to begin repairing damaged vehicles insured by Allstate
without waiting for a company adjuster to inspect the loss. This so-
called "direct repair program" involves selection of shops which, based
upon past experience, prepare competent estimates and perform quality
repairs at competitive prices in the judgment of Allstate. This program
is used only in cases where the customer expresses no shop preference.
State Farm's procedures for handling damaged claims are very
similar to those used by Allstate. State Farm agents estimate the cost of
repairs based upon the prevailing competitive price for the required
parts and labor in the particular geographic area. This price is deter-
mined through periodic surveys of local garages conducted by State
Farm personnel. Like Allstate, State Farm permits the insured to select
a garage of his choice, but the company will pay the competitive price
for the estimated repairs if an insured has no shop preference and re-
quests a recommendation. Upon such request, State Farm will provide
the insured with a list of conveniently located shops likely to perform
the required repairs at a competitive price.
Plaintiff Quality Auto Body, Inc. ("Quality"), an automobile re-
pair shop located in Westmont, Illinois, claimed that defendants' repair
estimates illegally fixed the price which Quality could charge for labor
and parts at the lowest prevailing competitive rate. Further, Quality
contended that the defendants' lists of recommended shops effectively
withheld business from shops that did not participate in defendants'
pricing programs, thereby amounting to a boycott in violation of sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act. The Court of Appeals was not deeply trou-
368
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bled by either issue and indeed took the opportunity to remind readers
that the antitrust laws are not protectionist.
Turning first to the price-fixing claim, the court assumed argu-
endo-as did the district court--that agreements between the defend-
ants and some body shops to perform the work for a set price could be
inferred.133 Quality urged that the alleged agreements between the de-
fendants and these "preferred" shops should be deemed per se illegal
because they were "blantantly anti-competitive," relying on the
Supreme Court's decision in Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v.
Royal Drug Co. 134 The Court of Appeals held that Royal Drug did not
support such a theory, pointing out that the Supreme Court specifically
declined to express any opinion on the merits of a somewhat similar
arrangement involving health insurance companies and pharmacies. 13
5
Pointing first to "the Supreme Court's reluctance to recognize per se
violations of the antitrust laws without considerable knowledge of the
business practice in question and the impact of those practices on com-
petition" and further pointing out that no court which has examined
the antitrust implications of insurance provider agreements has used a
per se approach, the Seventh Circuit held that the rule of reason analy-
sis was appropriate. 36 Using this analysis, the court characterized the
alleged agreements as ones by which a shop which performs repair
work at the insurance company's prevailing competitive rate can expect
to be placed on a "preferred" list and receive a steady stream of refer-
rals from claims adjusters. The court found that such an agreement did
not restrain trade or violate the antitrust laws.1 37 Far from establishing
133. The court gave short shrift to plaintiffs horizontal price-fixing theory involving a conspir-
acy between Allstate and State Farm. Plaintiff had conceded the absence of any evidence of
horizontal agreement but urged that a conspiracy could be inferred from defendants' alleged ad-
herence to a "common formula" for calculating damage estimates. The court rejected this infer-
ence out of hand, pointing to the undisputed fact that the rates used by the defendants frequently
differed and holding that the "existence of these variances in the rates used by the two defendants
minimizes the possibility of any concerted action to fix the price of auto repair." 660 F.2d at 1200.
Alternatively, the court held that even if a horizontal agreement existed, it would be immuned
from antitrust scrutiny under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 10 et seq., which exempt
the " 'business of insurance' from the antitrust laws." Id at 1201. With respect to the alleged
vertical price-fixing, however, the court held that no antitrust exemption existed and proceeded to
consider the issue on the merits. Id at 1201-02.
134. 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
135. 440 U.S. at 210.
136. 660 F.2d at 1203.
137. The court stated:
A contract of this nature between a buyer (the insurance company) and a seller (the body
shop) generally does not, without more, appear to violate the antitrust laws at all. Only
if such an agreement contains restrictions on one party's activities other than those in-
volvedin the immediate purchase and sale does the possibility of a Sherman Act violation
arise. In refusing to pay a price higher than what they regard as the competitive rate,
defendants have not imposed any restriction on the repair shops beyond the immediate
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a Sherman Act violation, the existence of the alleged agreements
"seems merely to show agressive and competitive dealing by the insur-
ance companies."'
38
The court conceded that State Farm and Allstate were the first and
second largest automobile insurers in the United States respectively,
and that they have "an undeniable impact on the price structure of the
auto repair market." Nevertheless, the court drew attention to the lim-
ited function of the antitrust laws, holding that "the Sherman Act pro-
vides no remedy for imbalance of market power as such." 139 Thus,
plaintiff's being "at a huge disadvantage" as a trader did not constitute,
without more, an antitrust violation, a conclusion that the court found
to be supported by other recent decisions analyzing the antitrust impli-
cations of similar damage claim procedures. 14°
Central to the resolution of the case was the Court of Appeal's
recognition that the provider agreements were "nothing more than con-
tracts between a buyer and a seller determining the price of services
that the seller will perform."'41 Having properly characterized the true
nature of the challenged conduct, the court relied upon an obvious, but
seldom-expressed tenet of antitrust law: that a buyer is not required to
purchase from every seller.
142
Having disposed of the most serious of plaintiffs claims, the court
turned to Quality's allegation of a "group boycott." Unlike the usual
boycott claim, it was uncontroverted that neither Allstate nor State
Farm had ever refused to deal with Quality. Rather Quality com-
plained of defendants' refusal to pay the price it charged. Pouring
sales transaction. Defendants are simply taking steps to insure the best terms available
in the marketplace and firmly indicating their position on price to the sellers (the body
shops).
Id (emphasis in original).
138. Id at 1204.
139. Id
140. Id, citing Proctor v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 1980-2 Trade Cas.
63,591 (D.D.C. 1980); Chick's Auto Body v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 168
N.J. Super. 68, 401 A.2d 722 (1979), af9'dper curiam, 176 N.J. Super. 320, 423 A.2d 311 (1981);
DeBonaventura v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 419 A.2d 942 (Del. Ch. 1980), aff'd 428
A.2d 1151 (Del. 198 1). Subsequent to the handing down of the opinion in Quality Auto Body, the
District of Columbia Circuit affirmed Proctor. 675 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
141. 660 F.2d at 1205, quoting from the district court's opinion, 1980-2 Trade Cas. at 76,696.
142. The court emphasized that section 1 of the Sherman Act:
[D]oes not preclude a party from unilaterally determining the parties with whom it will
deal and the terms in which it will transact business. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250
U.S. 300 (1919). This is true even where, as here, the buyers are big and the sellers are
comparatively small.
660 F.2d at 1205.
Curiously, while Colgate has regularly been cited for the proposition that a seller may choose
those to whom he will sell, the converse proposition has seldom if ever been stated, perhaps be-
cause it is so self evident.
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some much-needed cold water on this claim, the court reminded plain-
tiff of the "Darwinian workings of competition (which the antitrust
laws are presumably designed to foster)" and that it was "in the con-
sumer's best interest" that high-costs, high-price shops lose business
and even go out of business if they cannot meet competition. 1
43 Sum-
ming up, the court asserted, "Whatever sympathy one may feel for the
body shops in these circumstances, the antitrust laws were not intended
to provide redress for losses resulting from non-competitive prices."
44
Such common sense is refreshing in antitrust cases.
TYING: FE.L. PUBLIcATIONS V CATHOLIC BISHOP
In FEL. Publications, Ltd v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago 145-the
second of two opinions involving the blanket licensing system of a reli-
gious music publisher-the Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff's
system did not constitute a tying arrangement that was illegal under
either the per se or the rule of reason approach. In so holding, the
Court reversed the district court's granting of summary judgment in
favor of the defendant.
As explained earlier in this article, F.E.L. is a music publisher that
specializes in publishing and marketing liturgical sheet music and
hymnals. The copyrights to the hymns supplied by F.E.L. are
purchased from individual composers who assign the copyrights in
their compositions in exchange for royalties based on sales.
In 1965, F.E.L. began supplying music to Chicago's Catholic par-
ishes through an agreement with the Catholic Bishop of Chicago
("Bishop"), an Illinois corporation that owns all Catholic parish prop-
erty within the Archdiocese of Chicago. Because the Roman Catholic
Church had never developed a national hymnal, most individual par-
ishes in Chicago generally created their own, custom-made hymnals.
Prior to 1972, F.E.L. licensed to parishes the right to copy its songs on a
two cents per-song/per-copy basis for use in these hyinals. Copyright
infringement, however, became a widespread and serious problem for
F.E.L. in the parishes, prompting F.E.L. to institute its Annual Copy-
ing License in 1972. This license permitted parishes to copy one or
more of F.E.L.'s songs, numbering approximately 1,400, in unlimited
quantities for a period of one year for a fee of $100 per year. In addi-
tion to that license, F.E.L. offered a one time usage license which per-
143. 660 F.2d at 1206.
144. Id, citing Proctor and Chick's Auto Body.
145. 1982-1 Trade Cas. 64, 632 (7th Cir. 1982) (Swygert, Sr. J.). The other case, Repp v.
F.E.L. Publications, Ltd., is discussed supra at notes 2-21 and accompanying text.
CHICAGO KENT LAW REVIEW
mitted a licensee to copy F.E.L. songs for use at a single occasion at
two cents per copy per song, as well as printed hymnals and songbooks
and sheet music.
When F.E.L. became convinced that the Annual Copying License
had failed to discourage illegal copying, it filed suit against Bishop in
September of 1976, alleging copyright infringement under the 1909
Copyright Act, '4 unfair competition under the Lanham Act, 147 and
unfair competition under Illinois state law. As a result of an agreement
between the parties following initiation of litigation, some 1.5 million
unauthorized copies of F.E.L. songs were collected from the parishes
and impounded by the district court. After conclusion of discovery,
F.E.L. and Bishop filed counter-motions for summary judgment, and
the district court ruled in Bishop's favor. In particular, the district
court held that F.E.L.'s copyright claim was barred because the Annual
Copying License was a "tying contract" and a per se violation of the
Sherman Act. The Court of Appeals concluded that the granting of
summary judgment for the Bishop was error. 1
48
In deciding that the annual copying license was aper se violation
of the Sherman Act, the district court branded the license as a tying
contract, since in order to obtain F.E.L.'s most popular songs, a church
must also buy less popular songs as well. It analogized facts to those in
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. 149 In Paramount, theatre
owners were required to accept inferior-quality films (the tied product)
in order to obtain the right to show more popular films (the tying prod-
uct). The Supreme Court held this form of marketing to beper se ille-
gal under section 1 of the Sherman Act.1
5 0
The Court of Appeals disagreed with this characterization of the
license arrangement, stating that the annual copying licenses were more
appropriately analyzed as a blanket license under the precedent estab-
lished in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast System, Inc. '5'
As the Supreme Court did in Broadcast Music, the court concluded that
146. 17 U.S.C. § I et. seq. This has since been replaced by the 1976 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.
101 et. seq.
147. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a).
148. In addition to reversing on the Sherman Act ground, the Court of Appeals held that the
district court erred in its conclusions that F.E.L.'s copyright claim was barred because the annual
copying license was used to illegally extend F.E.L.'s copyright over exempt performances, that the
Lanham Act claim must be dismissed because it failed to satisfy the jurisdictional element of entry
into commerce, and that the State claims must be dismissed because the district court declined to
exercise pendent jurisdiction. 1982-1 Trade Cas. at pp. 73,462-64; 73,467-68.
149. 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
150. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
151. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
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the blanket license "has many pro-competitive, redeeming features
which prevent us from presuming it illegal without further inquiry." 
52
Describing the license as "a reasonable and flexible tool for dealing
with the unique problems associated with the Roman Catholic liturgi-
cal music market," the court found that it gave copyright holders pro-
tection and also allowed individual parishes to produce custom-made
hymnals at a reasonable cost. 153 Thus, like the Court in Broadcast Mu-
sic, the Seventh Circuit held that such a combination of protection and
efficiencies takes the arrangement out of the per se rule.
54
The Court of Appeals also followed Broadcast Music in conclud-
ing that the annual copying license was not a tying arrangement, but
was a separate and unique product composed of the individual compo-
sitions plus the aggregating service in which "the whole is truly greater
than the sum of its parts."' 55 The court pointed out that the district
court never identified the tying and tied products. The court stated that
"[e]stablishing the existence of a tying contract requires more than a
bold assertion that some songs are more popular than others."'
' 56
Given the substantial similarity between the instant case and Broadcast
Music, the court concluded that there was little doubt that the annual
copying license was not aper se violation.
The court went on to evaluate the license under the rule of reason.
Although the posture of the case was one of summary judgment, the
parties urged that it could be decided without further evidentary pro-
ceedings, and the court agreed. The court began its discussion by stat-
ing that, under the rule of reason, an agreement whose anti-competitive
effects outweigh its pro-competitive effects is an unreasonable restraint
of trade.
57
Citing the Second Circuit's decision in Broadcast Music on re-
mand, 58 the Court of Appeals also held that a blanket license "does
152. 1982-1 Trade Cas. at p. 73,465.
153. Id
154. Id, citing Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 19, 21.
155. Id, quoting Broadcast Music, 441 U.S. at 21-22.
156. 1982-1 Trade Cas. at p. 73,465.
157. Id. at p. 73,466, citing National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, 435
U.S. 679 (1978). The Bishop court added, "In our case, the balancing of pro- and anti-competitive
effects need not be undertaken because we find that the [Annual Copying Licenses] has no anti-
competitive effect." Id This statement provides a much needed gloss on Justice Stevens' enuncia-
tion of the rule of reason in National Society. The National Society formulation appears to dichot-
omize business conduct into either anti-competitive or pro-competitive modes. This, of course,
cannot have been what Justice Stevens meant, for much business conduct is neither; it is simply
competition. As the Court of Appeals recognized in FE.L Publications, the first question is
whether the challenged business conduct constitutes a restraint of trade at all. Only after that
inquiry does the balancing test come into play.
158. 620 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 970 (1981).
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not restrain trade or have anti-competitive effects if an alternative op-
portunity to acquire rights to the individual songs is fully available."' 159
Pointing to the availability of either the one-time use license or the
purchase of songbooks, songcards, or sheet music from F.E.L., the
court concluded that realistically available marketing alternatives did
exist which remove "the potential for coercion (in the form of price
fixing)" from the annual copying license. 160 Recognizing that the an-
nual copying license was the only license offered by F.E.L. which al-
lowed parishes to include F.E.L. songs and custom-made hymn notes,
the court noted that a copyright owner is not required to market its
copyrights in a form most convenient to its customers.' 6 ' Thus, the
court once again made clear that the antitrust laws have decidedly lim-
ited purposes and do not give courts free rein to review the business
judgments of those engaged in Commerce.
MERGERS: KAISER ALUMINUM & CHEMICAL V FTC
In Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Federal Trade Commis-
sion,162 the Court of Appeals set aside a cease and desist order issued in
1979 by the commission directing Kaiser to divest itself of all the assets
which it obtained from a 1974 acquisition. In so doing, the court reem-
phasized certain principles of relevant product market analysis that
contrast with those in other circuits and cut back substantially on the
so-called "weak company" defense of United States v. International
Harvester. 1
63
In 1974, Kaiser acquired the Lavino division ("Lavino") of Inter-
national Minerals & Chemicals Corporation ("IMC"). Prior to that
acquisition, Kaiser and Levino separately produced "refractories", i.e.,
heat-resistant materials that are used in the linings of industrial fur-
naces in kilns. The primary consumer of refractories in the United
States is the steel industry; although the copper, glass, and cement in-
dustries also use refractories. 164
159. 1982-1 Trade Cas. at p. 73,466, citing Broadcast Music on remand, 620 F.2d at 936.
160. Id at p. 73,466-67.
161. Id at p. 73,466. The court continued:
Neither the copyright laws nor the antitrust laws guarantee churches the right to produce
custom-made hymnals; a copyright owner can sell sheet music only if he so desires. We
cannot overlook F.E.L.'s alternative marketing practices simply because they do not al-
low custom-made hymnals, and neither the expense nor the inconvenience of these alter-
natives makes them unreasonable.
Id
162. 652 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1981) (Baker, D.J.). The Commission's decision is reported at 93
F.T.C. 764 (1979).
163. 564 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1977).
164. 652 F.2d at 1327-29.
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The court first considered the FTC's definition of relevant mar-
kets. The parties had agreed that the relevant geographic market was
the United States in its entirety; however, there was substantial disa-
greement about the product market. The Commission defined an over-
all product market consisting of "basic" refractories (which the steel
industry used almost exclusively) and subdivided it into markets for
basic bricks and basic specialties. (The latter are used to repair and
protect basic bricks and as mortar when a furnace lining is first con-
structed). The Commission went on to divide the market for basic
bricks into a submarket for "BOF bricks" which are used in BOF (ba-
sic oxygen furnace) steel making and into a submarket for conventional
basic bricks which are used in open-hearth furnaces and in other indus-
trial processes. The Commission reached its product market definitions
by concluding that there was substantial interchangeability of use in
basic refractories and that, where interchangeability of use was not in-
dicated, there was sufficient cross-elasticity of supply to support the
markets defined. 1
65
Turning to the proper criteria for market definition, the court
stated that the concept of economic substitution is the primary means
by which to define a product market and that "the clearest indication
that products should be included in the same market is if they are actu-
ally used by consumers in a readily interchangeable manner."' 166 The
court recognized that cross-elasticity of supply, or production flexibility
among sellers, is "another relevant factor" to be considered in defining
a product market for anti-trust purposes; however, the court reaffirmed
its previous refusal to accept the possibility that a market could be de-
fined solely on the basis of cross-elasticity of supply. 167 The court also
reaffirmed the usefulness of the concept of "submarkets" established by
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States. 168
165. Id at 1329.
166. 652 F.2d at 1330, quoting United States v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377,
399-400 (1956).
167. Id at 1330. The court acknowledged that "economic theory" would envisage defining a
market only on the basis of cross-elasticity of supply, citing Spectrofuge Corp. v. Beckman Instru-
ments, Inc., 575 F.2d 256, 280 n.79 (5th Cir. 1978). The court contrasted its previous decisions
such as Beatrice Foods Co. v. Federal Trade Commission, 540 F.2d 303, 307 (7th Cir. 1976);
Sargent-Welch Scientific Co. v. Ventron Corp., 567 F.2d 701, 710 (7th Cir. 1977) with decisions in
two other circuits, Twin City Sportservice, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 512 F.2d 1264, 1271-74
(9th Cir. 1975); Telex Corp. v. International Business Machines Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 914-19 (10th
Cir. 1975).
168. 370 U.S. 294, 325 (1962). In Brown Shoe, the Court held that "well-defined submarkets
may exist which, in themselves, constitute product markets for antitrust purposes" and set forth
the following standard for defining such submarkets in a Clayton Act section 7 case:
The boundries of such a submarket may be determined by examining such practical
indicia as industry or public recognition of the submarket as a separate economic entity,
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Applying these legal principles to the conclusion reached by the
FTC, the court "rejected out of hand" Kaiser's contention that the
proper product market is all refractories since there is virtually no in-
terchangeability of use of basic and non-basic refractories. 169 Simi-
larly, the court rejected the Commission's conclusion that an overall
basic refractories market existed. Pointing to the Commission's finding
that there was no interchangeability of use between BOF bricks and
conventional bricks the court held that they could not be included in
the same market, for even though they do have cross-elasticity of sup-
ply, that factor alone is insufficient under Seventh Circuit precedent. 70
The Commission's decision to include basic specialties in the overall
market with bricks, according to the court, "only compounds the error"
since specialties and bricks are not reasonably interchangeable and,
even if they were, conventional bricks appear to demand specialties
that are different from the specialties demanded by BOF bricks. ' 7' For
the latter reason, the court held that the FTC's definition of a sub-
market composed all basic specialties was not supported by substantial
evidence. However, the court did uphold the Commission's definition
of separate submarkets for conventional bricks and for BOF bricks. 172
The Court of Appeals then turned to the broader question of
whether the Commission applied correct legal standards in determining
that the acquisition might substantially lessen competition in the rele-
vant market or submarket. This required the court to resolve conflict-
ing interpretations of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
General Dynamics Corp. 173 On the one hand, the Commission "ap-
plie[d] a narrow and restrictive reading to that case, confining it almost
to its facts," while, on the other, Kaiser broadly interpreted General
Dynamics, arguing for the recognition of a "weak company"
the product's peculiar characteristics and uses, unique production facilities, distinct cus-
tomers, distinct prices, sensitivity to price changes and specialized vendors.
370 U.S. at 325.
169. 652 F.2d at 1331.
170. Id at 1332.
171. Id
172. Id It should be noted that the court's treatment of relevant market definition left unclear
the appropriate standard of review on appeal. The court stated early in its discussion, "The defini-
tion of relevant markets within which to measure the effects on competition of the proposed acqui-
sition is a question of fact. As such, the Commission's findings as to relevant markets are to be
accorded great deference and are to be upheld if supported by substantial evidence." 652 F.2d at
1329. In holding that the Commission was "in error when it formed [its] definition," the court
applied the test of Brown Shoe for market definition to the Commission's "findings". Id. at 1332.
This approach is in line with the court's earlier holding that market definition is a "mixed question
of law and fact". See United States v. Household Finance Corp., 602 F.2d 1255, 1260 n.7 (7th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1044 (1981).
173. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
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defense. 174
The court began its analysis with a history of Supreme Court
merger decisions after the 1950 amendment to Clayton Act Section 7
and appeared to agree with Justice Stewart's famed dissent, which pro-
tested that "[tlhe sole consistency that I can find is that in litigation
under Section 7, the Government always wins."'' 75 The court also ap-
peared to agree with "judges, lawyers, and commentators [who] widely
regard [General Dynamics] as ushering in a new era of Clayton Act
Section 7 merger analysis."'
' 76
In General Dynamics, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of
the Government's Section 7 claim on the ground that its statistics on
concentration resulting from the merger did not accurately forecast
competitive conditions in the relevant market. 177 Recognizing that the
Supreme Court has not explained or amplified General Dynamics to
any significant degree, and that lower courts have read General Dynam-
ics in a variety of ways, 178 the Court of Appeals attempted to clarify
General Dynamics and its own earlier decision in United States v. Inter-
national Harvester. 
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Conceding that its opinion in International Harvester had given
birth to a much-criticized "weak company" defense, 80 the court de-
clared that such a theory represented a "mischaracterization" of the
opinion and that International Harvester did not rely solely on the ac-
quired firm's weak financial condition as a defense to section 7.181
Rather, the court explained, it had affirmed the district court's dismis-
sal of a section 7 action for five separate reasons: (1) the acquired com-
174. 652 F.2d at 1332-33.
175. Id at 1334-1335, quoting United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966)
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
176. Id at 1335.
177. 415 U.S. at 501. The Court of Appeals explained that, under General Dynamics, the
weakness of the government's statistics lay in the fact that they measuredpast production which
does not necessarily give a proper picture of a company's future ability to compete. Because
electric utilities purchased most of the nation's coal pursuant to long-term requirements contracts,
the absence of its acquiree's uncommitted proven coal reserves substantiate a General Dynamic's
defense that, even if its acquiree remained in the market, it did not have sufficient reserves to
compete effectively for long-term contracts. 652 F.2d at 1335-36.
178. 652 F.2d at 1337.
179. 564 F.2d 769 (7th Cir. 1977).
180. The Court of Appeals had there permitted a merger, stating that the acquired company's
"weak financial reserves (like United Electric's weak coal reserve in General Dynamics) would not
allow it to be as strong a competition as the bald statistical projections indicate." 564 F.2d at 773.
For a critique, see, P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW (1980) at 935, which would
disregard financial difficulties unless (1) "they would cause the firm's market share to decline to a
level that would make the merger permissible, and (2) there is no competitively preferable alterna-
tive for resolving them."
181. 652 F.2d at 1339.
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pany's financial weakness belied its apparent market strength; (2) the
acquirer lacked defacto control over the acquiree; (3) the acquiree's
competitive strength improved after the acquisition; (4) intense compe-
tition continued between acquirer and acquiree; and (5) competition
improved and had become less concentrated in the relevant market.
1 82
The Court of Appeals pointed out that "[s]ound economic theory sup-
ports any of the [latter] four grounds as reasons to avoid § 7 liability"
and that financial weakness is "probably the weakest ground of all.'
83
Accordingly, the court rejected Kaiser's broad reading of General
Dynamics.
At the same time, the court rejected the FTC's interpretation of
General Dynamics as "erroneous."'' 8 4 The court identified four sepa-
rate errors of the Commission. First, the General Dynamics defense is
not an "affirmative defense" in the sense that defendant bears the bur-
den of proof. Rather, while the defendant must come forward with
evidence to rebut the government's prima facie case by showing an in-
crease in market share in a concentrated market, the government "con-
tinues to bear the burden of persuasion."'' 85 In addition, the court held
that, in focusing on whether one firm's market share could be "im-
parted" to the other, the Commission missed the point of General Dy-
namics, since, when the "true measure of competition" was examined,
the acquiree's market share became converted into a negligible one.
8 6
Third, the court held that lack of control over the circumstances that
weakened the acquiree need not be shown, for "it is the Company's
future prospects at the time of the acquisition that count, not the cir-
cumstances that led to its then present state."' 87 Finally, the court re-
jected the Commission's requirement that Kaiser show that neither
182. 652 F.2d at 1338.
183. ld at 1339. The court emphasized that, while financial weakness may be relevant "in
some cases," it "certainly cannot be the primary justification of a merger in resistance to a § 7
proceeding." Id at 1341. This does not mean that the court has read "financial weakness" out of
section 7 analysis, however. Shortly after the Kaiser Aluminum decision, another panel of the
Court drew attention to the "steadily deteriorating" market position of the acquired company---as
well as the "dramatic" decline in the post-acquisition market shares of the acquiring company-in
upholding a merger. Lektro-Vend Corp. v. Vendo Co., 660 F.2d 255, 276-77 n.22 (7th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1277 (1982).
184. 652 F.2d at 1339. The court noted that the Commission had "on numerous occasions"
misinterpreted General Dynamics as "a case of statistical measurement of the wrong economic
factors." Id at 1339-40 n. 11, citing tllsbury Co., 93 F.T.C. 966, 1033-36 (1979); In the Matter of
Reichhold Chemicals, Inc., 91 F.T.C. 246, 289-90 (1978); In the Matter of Jim Walter Corp., 90
F.T.C. 671, 720, 753-55 (1977); In the Matter of American General Insurance Co., 89 F.T.C. 557,
603-04, 621 (1977); and In the Matter of Liggett & Myers, Inc., 87 F.T.C. 1074, 1165, 1171-72
(1976).




remedy the weakened firm's position pointing out that, if an acquirer
could not remedy the weakness, it would never be interested in the
acquisition. 18 8
In remanding the case to the FTC, the court summarized the
proper principles to be applied. It stated that market concentration sta-
tistics are the primary index for measuring market power, but that non-
statistical information can be used as rebuttable evidence. 8 9 While the
Court of Appeals' view of "production flexibility" as a tool in market
definition remains unique, the Court's reinterpretation of International
Harvester brings it into line with the approach to General Dynamics
followed by other circuits.
CONCLUSION
The Court of Appeals' 1981-82 antitrust decisions reflect an in-
creasingly sophisticated analysis that demands proof of real economic
harm before conduct is declared unlawful under the Sherman or Clay-
ton Acts.
188. 1d
189. Id at 1341. The Court asserted:
[U]nder General Dynamics market concentration statistics continue to be the primary
index for measuring market power, and, if they are unrebutted, those statistics standing
alone can support a finding of a § 7 violation. The market concentrmion statistics, how-
ever, must be relevant to the focus of competition. The statistics must be an accurate
measure of future ability to compete in a relevant market. Nonstatistical evidence which
casts doubt on the persuasive quality of the statistics to predict future anticompetitive
consequences may be offered to rebut the prima facie case made out by the statistics.
The nonstatistical evidence of relevant economic factors must be weighed by the trier of
fact in arriving at a conclusion as to whether the effect of an acquisition may be substan-
tially to lessen competition. Among the factors to be considered might be ease of entry
into the market, the trend of the market either toward or away from concentration, and
the continuation of active price competition. In some cases unique economic circum-
stances might make other factors significant, e.g., the genuine independence of the ac-
quired company as in United States v. International Harvester Co., 564 F.2d 769 (7th
Cir. 1977) or the merger of two small firms to survive competitively in a market, or the
demand of a market for large producers.

